When four activist judges overturned the will of the people, the three remaining judges dissented. Read what they had to say about the court’s decision to engage in social engineering from the bench.

Justices Baxter and Chin – Excerpts from the Dissent
“Only one other American state recognizes the right the majority announces today. So far, Congress, and virtually every court to consider the issue, has rejected it. Nothing in our Constitution, express or implicit, compels the majority’s startling conclusion that the age-old understanding of marriage — an understanding recently confirmed by an initiative law — is no longer valid.”

“California statutes already recognize same-sex unions and grant them all the substantive legal rights this state can bestow. If there is to be a further sea change in the social and legal understanding of marriage itself, that evolution should occur by similar democratic means. The majority forecloses this ordinary democratic process, and, in doing so, oversteps its authority.”

“The question presented by this case is simple and stark. It comes down to this: Even though California’s progressive laws, recently adopted through the democratic process, have pioneered the rights of same-sex partners to enter legal unions with all the substantive benefits of opposite-sex legal unions, do those laws nonetheless violate the California Constitution because at present, in deference to long and universal 
tradition, by a convincing popular vote, and in accord with express national policy, they reserve the label “marriage” for opposite-sex legal unions? I must conclude that the
answer is no.”

“…..a bare majority of this court, not satisfied with the pace of democratic change, now abruptly forestalls that process and substitutes, by judicial fiat, its own social policy views for those expressed by the People themselves. Undeterred by the strong weight of state and federal law and authority, the majority invents a new constitutional right, immune from the ordinary process of legislative consideration.  The majority finds that our Constitution suddenly demands no less than a permanent redefinition of marriage, regardless of the
popular will.”

“The majority has violated these principles. It simply does not have the right to erase, then recast, the age-old definition of marriage, as virtually all societies have understood it, in order to satisfy its own contemporary notions of equality and justice.”

Justice Corrigan – Excerpts from the Dissent
“But I, and this court, must acknowledge that a majority of Californians hold a different view, and have explicitly said so by their vote.  This court can overrule a vote of the people only if the Constitution compels us to do so. Here, the Constitution does not. Therefore, I must dissent.”

“It is important to be clear. Under California law, domestic partners have ‘virtually all of the same  substantive legal benefits and privileges’ available to traditional spouses. I believe the Constitution requires this as a matter of equal protection.  However, the single question in this
case is whether domestic partners have a constitutional right to the name of ‘marriage.’ Proposition 22 was enacted only eight years ago. By a substantial majority the people voted to recognize, as ‘marriage’ only those unions between a man and a woman. (Fam. Code, § 308.5.) The majority concludes that the voters’ decision to retain the traditional definition of marriage is unconstitutional. I disagree.”

“Domestic partnerships and marriages have the same legal standing, granting to both heterosexual and homosexual couples a societal recognition of their lifelong commitment. This parity does not violate the Constitution, it is in keeping with it. Requiring the same substantive legal rights is, in my view, a matter of equal protection. But this does not mean the traditional definition of marriage is unconstitutional.”

“The legitimate purpose of the statutes defining marriage is to preserve the traditional understanding of the institution. For that purpose, plaintiffs are not similarly situated with spouses. While their unions are of equal legal dignity, they are different because they join partners of the same gender. Plaintiffs are in the process of
founding a new tradition, unfettered by the boundaries of the old one.”

“The majority ignores the fact that plaintiffs already have those rights and privileges under the Domestic Partnership Act. The majority aptly articulates how domestic partnerships and marriages are the same. But it fails to recognize that this case involves only the names of those unions. The fact that plaintiffs enjoy equal substantive rights does not situate them similarly with married couples in terms of the traditional designation of marriage.”